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Prior work
• Firm level corporate governance attributes are 
associated with the cost of equity capital
• Beneficial impact of country level legal 
institutions and regulations on the cost of equity
• Very little research has delved into the impact of 
the combination of the two factors on the cost of 
equity
Financial development
• No paper explicitly investigates the role of financial 
development in influencing the corporate governance-
cost of equity capital relationship.
• Financial development strongly influences the economic 
growth of a country and that this effect works through 
firms’ abilities to access external finance.
• Country with sound financial system will have access to 
capital at a lower cost than a firm in a country with weak 
financial development.
Research questions
• The interactive effect of financial development and firm 
level corporate governance on its cost of equity capital
• To conduct a “horse race” between the substitution 
and complementarity hypotheses using a large recent 
cross-country sample
• To discern the relative impact of these two major 
factors in influencing the cost of capital
Hypothesis
• Complementarity hypothesis
- Firms operating in a country with a high level of 
financial development AND high quality firm level 
corporate governance experience lower cost of equity 
capital, ceteris paribus.
• Substitution hypothesis
- Firms operating in a country with a high level of 
financial development OR high quality firm level 
corporate governance experience lower cost of equity 
capital, ceteris paribus.
Database
• RiskMetrics- Corporate Governance scores
• I/B/E/S- Implied cost of equity from analysts 
forecasts data
• Datastream- Control variables
• Financial Development- Khurana et al. (2006)
• Legal origin- La Porta et al. (1997)
Corporate Governance scores
• Fifty-five governance attributes are compiled for 
each firm
• We score each firm based on whether or not it 
meets the threshold of good governance for that 
attributes
• These attributes cover four broad categories: 
Board, Audit, Anti-takeover and Compensation 
and Ownership
Implied cost of capital
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001): 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐵𝑉𝑡 + 
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖 − (𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆 ∗ 𝐵𝑉𝑡+𝑖−1)
(1 + 𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆)𝑖
+
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+12 − (𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆 ∗ 𝐵𝑉𝑡+11)
𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆(1 + 𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆)12
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Claus and Thomas (2001): 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐵𝑉𝑡 + 
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖 − (𝑅𝐶𝑇 ∗ 𝐵𝑉𝑡+𝑖−1)
(1 + 𝑅𝐶𝑇)𝑖
+
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+5 − (𝑅𝐶𝑇 ∗ 𝐵𝑉𝑡+4) ∗ (1 + 𝑔𝑙𝑡 )
(𝑅𝐶𝑇−𝑔𝑙𝑡 )(1 + 𝑅𝐶𝑇)5
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Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005): 
𝑃𝑡 =
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝐽
+
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2 − 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 − (𝑅𝑂𝐽 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 ∗  1− 𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑈𝑇 )
𝑅𝑂𝐽 (𝑅𝑂𝐽 − 𝑔𝑙𝑡 )
 
Easton (2004): 
𝑃𝑡 =
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2 − 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 + (𝑅𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑈𝑇)
𝑅𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛
2  
Sample Size & Time period
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 63 62 92 88 87
Austria 17 14 16 15 17
Belgium 21 16 22 22 23
Canada 125 126 82 117 118
Denmark 18 17 18 17 17
Finland 21 21 23 25 24
France 68 62 68 70 69
Germany 63 66 68 71 69
Greece 36 35 36 31 31
Hong Kong 41 48 93 96 91
Ireland 12 13 13 14 14
Italy 42 31 55 51 50
Japan 404 410 471 479 477
Netherlands 36 35 38 36 27
NZ 10 12 17 16 16
Norway 13 13 13 12 13
Portugal 10 8 10 11 12
Singapore 37 37 45 48 46
Spain 39 30 42 42 41
Sweden 23 24 23 27 25
Switzerland 40 43 46 46 45
UK 114 124 328 312 303
Total 1,253 1,247 1,619 1,646 1,615 
Corporate Governance Scores
Mean Median Mean Median
All countries 0.438 0.410 Italy 0.409 0.425
Australia 0.498 0.495 Japan 0.363 0.365
Austria 0.434 0.429 Netherlands 0.464 0.466
Belgium 0.361 0.347 New Zealand 0.445 0.447
Canada 0.610 0.613 Norway 0.412 0.399
Denmark 0.420 0.411 Portugal 0.328 0.322
Finland 0.483 0.481 Singapore 0.421 0.422
France 0.452 0.459 Spain 0.399 0.403
Germany 0.464 0.477 Sweden 0.432 0.426
Greece 0.335 0.330 Switzerland 0.476 0.477
Hong Kong 0.406 0.410 United Kingdom 0.507 0.517
Ireland 0.450 0.460
Implied Cost of Equity
Estimates
Mean Median 25th
percentile
75th
percentile
Cost of Equity- Average 9.74% 9.06% 7.39% 10.99%
Cost of Equity- GLS 8.16% 7.85% 6.41% 9.24%
Cost of Equity- CT 9.41% 8.21% 5.81% 10.69%
Cost of Equity- OJ 10.88% 10.44% 7.89% 13.14%
Cost of Equity- Easton 11.13% 10.10% 4.25% 12.74%
Implied Cost of Equity estimates using 
four different models
Cost of equity estimates by country
Country Mean St. Dev. Median
Australia 9.94% 3.38% 9.37%
Austria 10.88% 4.27% 9.89%
Belgium 10.48% 3.14% 9.96%
Canada 10.02% 4.26% 9.33%
Denmark 9.26% 3.88% 8.29%
Finland 10.67% 4.00% 9.73%
France 9.69% 2.65% 9.46%
Germany 10.36% 4.13% 9.58%
Greece 11.77% 5.61% 10.20%
Hong Kong 10.17% 4.85% 9.28%
Ireland 12.94% 6.96% 10.52%
Italy 10.42% 4.90% 9.45%
Japan 8.48% 3.39% 7.87%
Netherlands 9.39% 2.29% 9.11%
NZ 11.53% 5.46% 9.71%
Norway 11.00% 5.17% 10.09%
Portugal 10.08% 4.63% 8.93%
Singapore 12.24% 7.18% 10.24%
Spain 9.66% 2.87% 9.24%
Sweden 9.64% 3.10% 9.01%
Switzerland 9.22% 3.52% 8.52%
UK 10.34% 4.71% 9.96%
Control Variables Mean Median 25th
percentile
75th
percentile
Beta 0.974 0.853 0.507 1.313
Log (M/V) 8.001 7.918 7.038 8.930
Log (B/M) -0.722 -0.647 -1.072 -0.270
Inflation 1.92% 1.95% 0.40% 3.03%
Momentum 9.62% 7.87% -5.77% 22.43%
Forecast Error -0.43% 0.06% -0.35% 0.51%
Liquidity 89.30% 90.77% 87.69% 93.85%
Freefloat 71.88% 77.00% 53.00% 92.00%
Summary statistics of control variables
Common Law
Mean (Median)
Civil Law
Mean (Median)
t-test differences 
(prob)
Investor Protection
0.634
(0.612)
0.374
(0.363)
4.67
(0.00)
Private Enforcement
0.678
(0.684)
0.448
(0.443)
4.19
(0.00)
Public Enforcement
0.623
(0.675)
0.459
(0.500)
2.72
(0.01)
Newspaper Circulation
2.620
(2.200)
2.210
(1.630)
0.64
(0.52)
Institutional Development in Common Law 
versus Civil Law Countries
Financial Development and Legal Origin 
Legal Origin
Civil Law Common Law
Country FININT SKTMKT Country FININT SKTMKT
Austria 1.26 -0.74 Australia 0.61 0.42
Belgium 0.62 1.03 Canada 0.59 0.5
Denmark 1.02 -0.05 New Zealand 1.07 -0.39
Finland 0.27 1.63 Singapore 1.25 0.61
France 0.85 0.61 United Kingdom 2.02 2.27
Germany 1.52 0.69
Italy 0.75 0.38
Japan 2.71 0.17
Netherlands 2.14 1.45
Norway 0.43 -0.1
Portugal 2.13 -0.28
Spain 1.36 2.25
Sweden -0.05 1.87
Switzerland 2.14 3.31
Mean 1.23 0.87 Mean 1.11 0.68
Median 1.14 0.65 Median 1.07 0.50
Corporate Governance and cost of equity
Cost of equityaverage,i,j,t= β1+ β2 CG Scorei,j,t +  ∑Φ Control Variablesi,j,t+ εi,j,t
Control Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient p-value
Corporate Governance - -0.029 0.000
Beta + 0.006 0.000
Log (M/V) - -0.004 0.000
Log (B/M) + 0.008 0.000
Inflation + 0.428 0.000
Momentum - -0.016 0.000
Forecast Error - -0.038 0.000
Liquidity - -0.012 0.156
Freefloat ? 0.009 0.000
Corporate 
Governance (CG)
N Adj-R2
Investor Protection
Low -0.021 3,723 13.50%
High -0.031*** 3,657 15.70%
Private Enforcement
Low -0.009 1,849 15.60%
High -0.036*** 5,531 15.50%
Public Enforcement
Low -0.023** 3,680 13.50%
High -0.031*** 3,700 15.80%
Newspaper Circulation
Low -0.003 2,517 11.30%
High -0.058*** 4,524 17.50%
Cost of equity estimates under different 
states of investor protection
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Cost of equityaverage,i,j,t= β1+ β2 CG Scorei,j,t +  ∑Φ Control Variablesi,j,t+ εi,j,t
Corporate Governance & Cost of Equity 
Regression Results
Dependent key variables Corporate 
Governance (CG)
N Adj-R2
Unconditional sample -0.029*** 7,380 15.73%
Legal Origin- Common Law -0.049*** 2,860 15.40%
Legal Origin- Civil Law -0.006 4,520 14.17%
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t Financial Institution- High -0.046*** 5,123 17.17%
Financial Institution- Low -0.015 2,257 12.02%
Stock Market- High -0.046*** 3,092 17.68%
Stock Market- Low -0.007 4,288 12.52%
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Cost of equityaverage,i,j,t= β1+ β2 CG Scorei,j,t +  ∑Φ Control Variablesi,j,t+ εi,j,t
Legal Origin & Financial Development Regression 
Results
Corporate 
Governance (CG)
N Adj-R2
C
o
m
m
o
n
 L
aw
Financial Institution- High -0.096*** 1,829 18.97%
Financial Institution- Low -0.026 1,031 7.87%
Stock Market- High -0.096*** 1,829 18.97%
Stock Market- Low -0.026 1,031 7.87%
C
iv
il 
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w
Financial Institution- High -0.011 3,294 10.66%
Financial Institution- Low -0.005 1,226 16.67%
Stock Market- High -0.003 1,263 17.71%
Stock Market- Low 0.013 3,257 12.97%
Note: Sample split for Common Law countries based on Financial Development scores leads to 
same Financial Institution and Stock Market sub-sample.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Robustness checks
• Alternative Governance index using Aggarwal et 
al, 2007
• Alternative Financial Development score based 
on Global Financial Centres index
• Reclassify missing Financial Development 
scores of Hong Kong, Ireland and Greece in 
other categories
Conclusion
• Our study jointly examines the relative effects of 
institutional and firm level governance attributes on the 
cost of capital
• We show that firm level governance attributes affect the 
cost of equity capital only in Common Law countries with 
high level of financial development
• Our study highlights the complementary effects of legal 
origin, financial development and firm level governance 
attributes in influencing cost of equity capital
Implications
• Our study focusing on cost of equity estimates shows 
that improving firm level corporate governance alone will 
not be sufficient
• An essential prerequisite is the existence of high quality 
institutions in the country in which the firm operates
• It is imperative for policy makers to improve the legal 
institutional framework, before firm level improvements 
will work
